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THE M'NAGHTEN RULE:
A RE-EVALUATION
DANIEL WARD*

[Ed. Note. This article is a synopsis of an address presented
by Mr. Ward at the Symposium on Insanity as a Defense in
Criminal Law held at Marquette University in the Fall of 1961.
A transcript of the original address is on file in the Law Review
Office, Marquette University Law School, 1103 W. Wisconsin
Ave., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.]
The conventional and traditional summation of the rules from

M'Naghten has been the so-called M'Naghten rule to the effect that the
defendant accused of crime is not criminally responsible unless he was
able to distinguish between right and wrong in respect to the particular
act with which he is accused and also that he have had the ability to so
distinguish at the time of the alleged commission of the act.
I think it might be appropriate to say before we discuss further the
question of M'Naghten, that it seems important in any discussion of law,
...that the policy of the law and the society which the law serves determines under what conditions an act prohibited by law may be deemed
to be non-criminal. That is a matter resting within the province of the
law and those who interpret and administer the law ....

We do have

certain circumstances in which an ordinarily criminal act is regarded by
the law as non-criminal

....

I think it is proper that the law does have

the right to prescribe what is criminal and what is non-criminal. It may
seek advice from other sciences, rather disciplines, but ultimately the
responsibility of the determination is that of the law itself. . . I do
think it proper and germaine that we say, certainly as an historical matter, that our law, Anglo-American law, does have moral and ethical instincts in wells from which it draws. Certainly, in fields of criminal responsibility we have historically accepted the Judeo-Christian notion of
culpability being founded upon an understanding of the act, and, secondly, a free volition of act that is part of our historical tradition so
far as the law is concerned.
With respect to this moral instinct .

.

. your Wisconsin Supreme

Court in a concurring opinion by Justice Hallows,' said criminal law
and responsibility are based upon the facts that an individual human
being is mentally free to exercise a choice between possible courses of
conduct in respect to those acts condemned by the law and therefore is
morally and legally responsible.
In the same vein, the United States Court of Appeals, in Sauer v.
*State's attorney, Cook County, Illinois. Former Dean, DePaul University
School of Law, Chicago, Illinois.
Kwosek v. State of Wisconsin, 8 Wis. 2d 640, 100 N.W. 2d 339 (1960).
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United States,2 said in part that whatever we may conclude to objectives
of the criminal law, one traditional result has been punishment ...
The criminal law is grounded upon the theory that in the absence of
special conditions, individuals are free to exercise a choice between possible courses of conduct and hence are morally responsible. Thus, it is
moral guilt that the law stresses.
To laymen as well as to the vast majority of lawyers the rules
[M'Naghten] have seemed sound and efficient instruments in the determination of the important issues involved. Their survival for more
than a century in many countries is a further index of their validity.
Yet, almost from the day they were published, the rules have been
subjected to an unremitting criticism by medical men and psychologists.
[From the psychiatrist's point of view] the right and wrong test
represents antiquated and outworn medical and ethical concepts, whereas
the question of responsibility carries with it a metaphysical implication.
The remedies, especially punishment upon which the law seems to repose its faith are hangovers, as it were, from old theological and moral
ideas that have survived their period of usefulness in this 20th century
civilization.
The law itself has the right to determine what it will accept from
other sciences or arts or disciplines and the law is responsible for the
determination of who will be adjudged criminally responsible and who
will be exempted from responsibility. Solicitor General Sobeloff, writing
in the American Bar Journal,3 and speaking of the difficulties of the
psychiatrist in dealing with legal terms and concepts, said in part that
when a psychiatrist is forced to adopt a vocabulary of morality and
ethics, he is speaking in what to him is a foreign language.... When
he (the psychiatrist) presents demands that there be certain ideas of
his discipline accepted in the law, then he must translate his ideas, his
concepts, his vocabulary into the vocabulary and the ideas of the law.
And I revert, of course, to the notion that the primary responsibility of
what shall be adjudged to be the law shall be the responsibility of the
law itself.
In 1954, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, announced that M'Naghten was inadequate even when coupled
with the irresistible impulse test and announced a new rule which, as
Judge Basilon wrote, is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.4 This was a rule at variance with M'Naghten.... The court
in Durham said that this new rule, this rule of product, was being an2241 F. 2d 640 (9th Cir. 1957).
8 Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From WNaghten to Durham and
Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955).

4Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D.D.C. 1954).
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nounced as a complement to the rule of M'Naghten which earlier had
been adopted in the District of Columbia and as a supplement and addition to the irresistible impulse test which also had been adopted in the
District of Columbia. However, parenthetically I might observe that my
opinion is that as it stands, you cannot have the three standing in the
true sense in the District of Columbia. The Durham rule, that if the act
is the product of mental disease or defect, certainly visciates or possibly
overcomes consideration being given to the M'Naghten rule. Certainly,
if it can be found that the act complained of is the product of mental
disease or defect then there should be no consideration whatsoever of
M'Naghten, and there should be no consideration of the irresistible impulse. In other words, if the act was the product, then it is entirely irrelevant whether or not the defendant knew right from wrong with respect to the individual act. It is entirely irrelevant whether the act was
willingly committed-whether it was an act of volition on the part of
the defendant.
It .

.

. [offers] only the faintest hint of direction to the jury in its

search for the facts relevant to responsibility. The jury must make determinations about degrees of impairment or disease that puzzle the experts themselves. But the emphasis of the Durham test is on the question
of causation-the product. And here too the jury can do no more than
speculate. And finally, the Durham test ignores cognition. It ignores the
rational element of purpose-of conduct; or it best insinuates it under
a spacious mantle of verbal imprecision. It ignores the question that is
crucial from the perspective of the law: Whether the accused was competent to make the relevant moral decision.
In Kwosek v. State of Wisconsin5 referred to previously, Justice
Hallows said:
The Durham rule, while paying lip service to 'freedom of the
will,' is so broad that it ceases to be a practical and workable test
under the jury system. While the subject of much discussion and
hailed by some psychiatrists, generally those of the psycho-analytical school, the Durham rule has not been followed by some
eight state and two federal circuit courts which have had the
occasion to re-examine this question. Over 50 years before the
Durham case, this court rejected the 'product test' in Eckert v.
State, 114 Wis. 160, 89 N.W. 826 (1902) .6
The Justice then went on to say:
The Durham rule's great weakness is that it provides no legal
standard by which a jury can test conflicting medical and psychiatric testimony or by which the jury can evaluate such opinions.
Psychiatrists differ radically in their theories of mental illness,
of the nature of man, and of the mental process. They range
5 Supra note 1.
6 Id. at 653.
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from those who contend all criminals are insane in some sense of
the word and no one is responsible for his acts, to those who
believe man is endowed with the power of self-control which
may be destroyed or impaired by a mental disease or defect
through no fault of his own. The determinists and some psychoanalysts consider man's actions to be so influenced or controlled
by urges, impulses, and the subconscious as to be caused or determined without any power within man to control or choose his
course of conduct in any situation. Other psychiatrists believe
that man is a highly complex, integrated personality with the
power of self-choice and determination, and whose mental process has a unity of perceiving, apprehending, judging, and willing which may be interfered with by a disease or defect of the
mental order through no fault of his.7
We would not say, we could not say, we should not say that
M'Naghten is a perfect rule. There are difficulties in M'Naghten. One
of the greatest criticisms has been that M'Naghten appears to consider
only cognition and not volition. It is said by some, although there are
decisions which strongly dispute this, that the so-called right from wrong
test too sharply limits the expert in giving his opinion evidence. It is
confined within the rigid binds of right from wrong, and it does not
permit him to present to the jury other psychiatric observations and
data which may be pertinent. But what should be done? Because
M'Naghten is not perfect should it be discarded in toto? Should its concepts concerning a moral basis in Anglo-American law be discarded?
I think not. Because to do so would be of course to upset an attempt
to destroy the tradition upon which our law is founded. And that would
not be a purely historical thing either, because lawyers, knowing community sentiment and the moral feelings of the community apart from
the mores, in the great majority would say that M'Naghten correctly
reflects the community feeling toward things which the criminal law
brands as criminal.
The major relevant conclusion of the above analysis is that the
M'Naghten rules are sound and essential principles of penal responsibility. This is an implication of the theory of the integration of the self.
So long as the theory stands, the only possible criticism of the rules is
that though valid and necessary, they are not sufficient. Indeed, it is also
implied in psychological theory that the M'Naghten rules are defective
and lacking in any reference to the emotional and volitional aspects of
conduct. This has been long recognized. The rule should therefore be
amended to include explicitly what is now stated in instructions, but only
inadequately and occasionally by informed judges. The amended rule
should include the present tests, but these should be in significant juxtaposition to a simple description of the integration of the various func7 Id. at 653, 654.
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tions of the personality. These amended rules would continue the present
emphasis on irrationality as the principal criterion of insanity. The
formulation suggested above, implemented by an informed administration of the law, would provide a new interpretation of what criterion
which would probably be approved by most psychiatrists.

